The 65th round of the Geneva International Discussions, held from November 1–12, 2025, concluded with no advancement in resolving the long-standing Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts. As in previous rounds, the sides presented their familiar positions, but no common ground was found, reinforcing the stagnant nature of this format. Abkhaz journalist Inal Khashig argues that these discussions have always been unproductive, as they were never designed to resolve the conflicts but rather to maintain a “bad peace” that keeps tensions manageable without any real possibility of agreement.
Initially established after the 2008 war under the Medvedev–Sarkozy agreements, the Geneva Discussions were intended as an alternative to the failed UN-mediated Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations. Their primary goal has been to defuse tensions and maintain the status quo, with no expectation of a breakthrough. The meetings, held four times a year, have become a repetitive exercise with no real outcomes. Despite the geopolitical changes following the collapse of the old world order in February 2022, the discussions have remained unchanged, reflecting a bygone era that no longer aligns with the current global dynamics.
Georgia’s refusal to engage in direct talks with Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been a key obstacle to progress. Under former President Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia abandoned direct negotiations, hoping to leverage the support of the EU and the US to force Russia to withdraw its recognition of these regions. The Georgian Dream party, which succeeded Saakashvili’s government, has continued this approach, avoiding direct dialogue with Abkhazians and Ossetians while seeking independent negotiations with Moscow.
Despite attempts to improve relations with Russia after distancing from the EU, the Georgian government’s efforts have not yielded results. Towards the end of 2024, Russia proposed a Georgian-Abkhaz confederation, but the idea failed to gain traction. Without the agreement of the Abkhaz themselves, even Russian influence could not secure the proposal. This reflects the deep-seated resistance within Abkhazia to any dealings with Georgia.
The inability to reach a resolution through indirect negotiations has led Tbilisi to realize that relying on external powers, like Moscow or the EU, has not been successful. Yet, Georgia’s refusal to engage directly with Sukhum remains a significant barrier, a legacy of the Saakashvili era. Now, with Brussels and Washington no longer reliable allies and Moscow not offering the desired support, it raises the question: is it time for Tbilisi to reconsider its stance and initiate direct dialogue with Abkhazia?
The Geneva International Discussions have proven to be an ineffective platform for resolving these conflicts. As long as Georgia continues to avoid direct communication with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the deadlock will persist, leaving the region stuck in a fragile and unproductive peace.
