The AfyaKE shutdown has triggered a dispute between Murang’a County and the national government over the management of digital health services, integration with the Social Health Authority (SHA), and access to patient records. Governor Irungu Kang’ata says the system became unavailable on Tuesday, October 13, 2026, and accuses the national government of forcing the county to migrate to the national Taifa Care platform.
The outage has raised concerns about the continuity of hospital services in a county that relies on digital systems to manage patient registration, medical records, laboratory operations, pharmacy services, billing and referrals. These functions support daily hospital operations, meaning an interruption can affect several departments at once. The extent of the disruption, however, depends on which facilities and services have lost access.
Kang’ata says Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale had previously promised to connect AfyaKE to the SHA platform rather than shut it down. According to the governor, that commitment was not fulfilled. The county has consequently started moving health facilities to Taifa Care, with officials anticipating two to three days of disruption and hoping to restore normal operations by Monday, October 19.
The Ministry of Health has disputed the governor’s account. In a statement, it said it neither owns nor controls AfyaKE, does not manage the system, and does not possess its source code. The ministry described the platform as a private arrangement between the county and its developers.
It also denied that the Digital Health Agency (DHA) had rejected an application to certify AfyaKE, saying neither the county nor the developers had submitted one. The ministry urged Kang’ata to stop making what it described as misleading statements, while assuring the public that SHA patients in Murang’a would continue receiving care.
The disagreement leaves several questions unanswered. These include who controlled the infrastructure behind AfyaKE, why the system became unavailable, whether the county can retrieve its historical patient records, and what steps are necessary to connect its facilities to national health systems without disrupting services.
How AfyaKE Became Central to Murang’a Hospitals
AfyaKE served as a digital hospital management platform for facilities across Murang’a County. Its functions included patient registration, electronic medical records, laboratory services, pharmacy management, patient tracking, referrals, billing and telemedicine.
By bringing these activities into one system, the platform helped health workers manage information across different hospital departments. It also supported administrative processes, including the recording and collection of hospital revenue.
A 2024 case study published by the Council of Governors and Maarifa Centre counted 151 fully digitised health facilities in Murang’a. The county has since said AfyaKE was operating in 165 facilities, suggesting that its deployment may have expanded after the study.
Kang’ata has also credited the system with increasing annual county health revenue from KSh 80 million to KSh 800 million. He says the additional revenue supported infrastructure projects at Murang’a Level 5 Hospital, Kirwara Hospital and Nyakianga Hospital, alongside improvements in medicine supplies.
However, the revenue figures require independent verification. No audited accounts have been presented alongside the claim to establish how much of the reported increase resulted directly from AfyaKE. The earlier case study highlighted improvements in revenue collection processes, but the daily collection figures reported in that material do not readily reconcile with the annual comparison.
The distinction matters because digital systems can improve billing, accountability and collection without being the sole cause of revenue growth. A reliable assessment would require comparable financial records from before and after implementation, together with information about other changes in hospital financing and collection procedures.
Why the Government Is Moving Hospitals to Taifa Care
The dispute comes amid a wider effort to connect hospital management systems directly to the Social Health Authority.
On October 2, Duale said hospitals were being moved away from using the SHA Provider Portal as a separate claims channel and toward systems that could communicate directly with SHA. Under this approach, information recorded during a patient’s visit would support the claims process, reducing the need for staff to enter the same details into multiple platforms.
The intended benefits include less administrative duplication, easier verification of treatment and improved detection of questionable claims. Direct integration could also help authorised health workers access relevant patient information across facilities, provided that appropriate privacy and security safeguards are in place.
The Digital Health Agency is responsible for standards and the secure exchange of health information. Under the 2025 health information exchange regulations described in the dispute, systems must meet applicable requirements before connecting to the national exchange. The process includes documentation such as a compliance certificate, a data protection impact assessment and details about the developer.
These requirements do not automatically mean counties must abandon their existing software. A county system that meets the applicable standards could, in principle, continue supporting hospital operations while exchanging information with national platforms.
That distinction is central to Murang’a’s disagreement with the ministry. The question is not simply whether the county should use a national system. It is whether AfyaKE could have been connected to SHA while preserving access to existing records and avoiding interruptions to hospital services.
What Is Known About the AfyaKE Shutdown?
Neither side has publicly established a complete technical explanation for the outage in the information presented so far.
Kang’ata maintains that the national government switched off AfyaKE to force Murang’a to adopt Taifa Care. The Ministry of Health, meanwhile, says it does not own or manage the platform and denies that the DHA rejected a certification application.
No publicly presented server logs, hosting records, access-control changes or written termination notices have conclusively established who caused the system to become unavailable. The competing statements therefore remain disputed.
The county has also raised concerns about patient data accumulated since 2023. Officials have described the records as inaccessible, but that does not establish that the data has been deleted or destroyed. A system can become inaccessible because of login restrictions, hosting problems, network failures or changes to its domain configuration while the underlying records remain intact.
Some Level 2 and Level 3 facilities have reportedly stopped providing certain services and have been unable to submit SHA claims, according to reporting by Eastleigh Voice. However, a comprehensive official list of affected facilities and services has not been published in the material provided.
The operational consequences will become clearer when the county identifies which facilities are affected, which services remain available and how patient records will be accessed during the transition.
AfyaKE Ownership and Certification Remain in Dispute
The history of AfyaKE adds another layer to the disagreement. The Council of Governors and Maarifa Centre case study described the system as a Ministry of Health model offered free to counties willing to adopt it. Murang’a says its developers subsequently improved the platform.
A system’s original design, modified software, hosting infrastructure and operational management can involve different parties. Therefore, establishing who owns or controls each component requires access to contracts, technical records and the agreements governing the county’s deployment.
The Ministry of Health’s statement that it does not own or manage Murang’a’s implementation does not, by itself, establish who controlled the infrastructure that became unavailable. Similarly, the county’s allegation that the national government switched off the system requires technical evidence showing what changed and who authorised it.
The certification dispute should be resolvable through documentary evidence. If the county or its developers submitted an application to the DHA, the application date, supporting documents and official response should provide a record of what happened. If no application was submitted, the claim that certification was refused would need to be reconsidered.
It is also important to separate certification from system availability. Losing access to a national health information exchange does not necessarily require a county’s own hospital management software to stop working. Certification requirements govern access to the relevant national infrastructure; the precise cause of AfyaKE’s outage must be established independently.
If the interruption resulted from a hosting change, disabled credentials or a domain configuration issue, the technical explanation would differ from a case involving the suspension of access to a national data exchange.
Kang’ata has also pointed to a domain lookup that he says shows AfyaKE’s government domain using Treasury nameservers. Nameservers help direct internet traffic to the relevant services, so changes to domain configuration can affect whether a website is reachable. However, the lookup cited by the governor was last updated on May 28, 2026. It does not establish that anyone changed the configuration on October 13.
A dated technical audit would be needed to determine whether domain settings contributed to the outage.
Patient Data Protection and Transition Risks
Access to patient records is among the most significant concerns arising from the AfyaKE shutdown. Health information is sensitive personal data under Kenya’s Data Protection Act, and its handling must comply with applicable privacy and security requirements.
The health information regulations introduced in 2025 also address circumstances in which access to health data is discontinued, including requirements relating to transferring records, notifying affected individuals and informing the relevant agency within seven days, where applicable.
It remains unclear from the available information whether these obligations have been triggered in Murang’a, what steps have been taken to preserve the records, or whether patients and relevant authorities have received the required notices.
The county and the responsible data handlers should establish whether the databases remain intact, whether secure backups exist, and how authorised personnel can retrieve records during migration. They should also clarify how continuity of treatment will be maintained for patients who need follow-up appointments, laboratory results, prescriptions or referrals.
A system outage, a loss of access and the destruction of records are different situations. Public statements should distinguish between them until technical assessments establish the actual condition of the data.
The transition to Taifa Care also raises questions about the cost of operating the replacement platform. Kang’ata says AfyaKE was free to the county and argues that the new system will introduce charges. However, no published tariff or contract has been provided in the material presented to verify the claimed costs.
Any assessment should therefore consider the applicable licensing arrangements, implementation expenses, maintenance costs, training requirements and long-term support obligations before drawing conclusions about the financial impact on county hospitals.
Legal Questions Surrounding Digital Health Integration
The dispute also intersects with the legal framework governing Kenya’s digital health infrastructure.
The Digital Health Act of 2023 faced a constitutional challenge, and the High Court ruled it unconstitutional in 2024 over concerns relating to public participation. The Court of Appeal subsequently stayed that order, affecting the position while the legal dispute continued.
The precise current status of the proceedings and any subsequent orders should be verified before drawing conclusions about the legal basis for particular implementation decisions. Authorities and counties must ensure that their actions comply with the operative court orders and applicable legislation.
For Murang’a, the practical questions remain whether AfyaKE meets the relevant technical and data protection standards, what steps are needed for integration with SHA, and whether the transition can proceed without depriving patients and health workers of essential information.
The table below summarises the main disputed issues and the evidence needed to resolve them.
| Issue | County’s position | Ministry’s position | Evidence needed |
|---|---|---|---|
| System outage | The national government switched off AfyaKE on October 13. | The ministry says it does not own or manage the system. | Server logs, hosting records, access changes and technical audit findings. |
| DHA certification | The county says its integration efforts were not honoured. | The ministry says no formal certification application was submitted. | Application records, correspondence and any formal decision. |
| Replacement costs | The county says AfyaKE was free and Taifa Care will cost money. | The national system is intended to standardise health data and claims processes. | Published tariffs, contracts and implementation cost details. |
| Patient records | Records accumulated since 2023 are reportedly inaccessible. | The ministry says SHA patients will continue receiving care. | Database integrity checks, backup records and a documented recovery plan. |
What Happens Next for Murang’a Hospitals?
Murang’a wants to retain access to its existing hospital management system and patient records, while the national government is pursuing standardised systems that can connect to SHA.
The immediate priority is to maintain patient services while the county migrates facilities to Taifa Care. Health officials should communicate which facilities are affected, what alternative arrangements are available and how patients can obtain prescriptions, test results, referrals and follow-up care.
The county, Ministry of Health and Digital Health Agency also need to clarify the technical sequence of events. A joint report should identify when AfyaKE became unavailable, who controlled the relevant infrastructure, whether the records remain intact, and what caused the interruption.
The certification issue should be addressed through published application records and formal decisions. Likewise, the financial dispute requires documentation of the costs associated with both platforms rather than competing assertions.
Ultimately, integrating county health systems with national infrastructure should improve claims verification, information exchange and continuity of care. Achieving those goals requires clear responsibilities, compliant technology and reliable access to patient information.
Until the technical and documentary evidence is made public, the cause of the AfyaKE outage remains unresolved. Murang’a’s hospitals and patients need a clear account of what happened, together with practical assurances that essential services and medical records will remain accessible during the transition.
